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CURRENT DECISIONS
Miller, and those who agree with him, remain free to criticize na-
tional policy by the written and spoken word, but "they are simply not
free to destroy Selective Service Certificates." 25
Glenn ]. Sedam Jr.
Constitutional Law-RESTRICTIVE RACIAL COVENANTS-THE INFER-
ENCE OF PROPOSITION 14. In Mulkey v. Reitnan,' plaintiff was denied
the opportunity to rent an available apartment due solely to his race,
being a Negro. From plaintiff's appeal on summary judgment entered
upon the pleadings, the California Supreme Court held that article I,
section 26,2 of the California Constitution, prohibiting the state from
denying the right of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent his real
property to such persons as he in his own discretion chooses, consti-
to say that future appeals would concentrate on what he termed prejudicial statements
by trial judges and other alleged trial errors, rather than on further constitutional
challenges to the law." N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1967, page 1, col. 6.
25. Supra, note 14, at 82. On April 10, 1967, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
held in O'Brien v. U.S., 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), that the 1965 Amendment did
constitute an unnecessary regulation of speech, although conviction was affirmed on
other grounds. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
1. 50 Cal.Rptr.881, 413 P.2d 825 (1966).
2. Proposition 14 after its incorporation by the people of California at the polls in
1964.
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to such person or persons
as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other legal entities
and their agents or representatives but does not include the State or any sub-
division thereof with respect to the sale, lease or rental of property owned by it.
"Real property" consists of any interest in real property of any kind or quality,
present or future, irrespective of how obtained or financed, which is used, de-
signed, constructed, zoned or otherwise devoted to or limited for residential pur-
poses whether as a single family dwelling or as a dwelling for two or more
persons or families living together or independently of each other.
This Article shall not apply to the obtaining of property by eminent domain
pursuant to Article I, Sections 14 and 14Y2 of this Constitution, nor to the renting
or providing of any accommodations for lodging purpose by a hotel, motel or
other similar public place engaged in furnishing lodging to transient guests.
If any part or provision of this Article, or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Article, including the appli-
cation of such part or provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be
affected thereby and shall continue in force and effect. To this end the provisions
of this Article are severable.
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tutes affirmative action on the part of the state to change its existing laws'
from a situation where discrimination was legally restricted to one
wherein it was encouraged; and that, therefore, the provision was void
in its general application, as it denied those similarly situated as plaintiff
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.4 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States the
judgment of the California Supreme Court was affirmed.5
The problem confronting the Court in this situation was not merely
the stigma of state action6 significant enough to bring the matter under
the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the con-
flicting claims of liberty versus equality," but essentially whether restric-
tive racial covenants could be in fact implied, and therefore void in
their enforcement similarly to those overtly manifested.
The right that all persons should have equal opportunity to purchase
and enjoy property has been derived from the constitutional and legis-
lative history of the United States through the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Bill of 18663 respectively. In Buchanan v. Warley,9
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional, as being excessively discrim-
inatory, state legislation that endeavored to zone a city on a racial basis. 10
3. CAL. CIVIL CODE sections 51-52 (Unruh Civil Rights Act 1959); CAL. HEAmH &
SAFETY CoDE sections 35700-35744 (Rumford Fair Housing Act 1963).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIX, section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S. Ct. 1627 (1967).
6. A collateral issue of prime consideration in this case. For an excellent discussion
on this highly controversial subject, see generally, Note, An Argument in Favor of Strict
Adherence to State Action Requirement, 5 WM. & MARY L. REv. 213 (1965).
7. One of the major arguments by the dissenting opinion was that the liberty of the
people of California in exercising their franchise had been abrogated by disregarding
the will of their mandate on Proposition 14.
8. Both were passed in the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress (1866). One
of the primary considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the
guarantees of the 1866 Civil Rights Bill into the organic law of the land. Also found in
8 U.S.C. section 42, 8 U.S.C. section 42.
9. 245 U.S.60 (1917). See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.633 (1948). Cf., Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S.252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.296 (1940) (Excessive
use of state's police power).
10. Why the opinion in this particular case took the shape it did is not hard to con-
jecture, for at the time, the equal protection clause still bore the relative fresh gloss
of the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.537 (1896).
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Buchanan and subsequent similar decisions1 caused supporters of resi-
dential segregation to rely upon judicial enforcement of these cove-
nants.' 2 However, it was not until Shelley v. Kraemer'3 that the con-
stitutionality of racial covenants was tested, and where the Supreme
Court held that their judicial enforcement was a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws.14
Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as an essential pre-condition to
the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which that amend-
ment was intended to guarantee. 5 The various mentioned enactments
did not deal with the social rights of men, but with those fundamental
rights in property which were intended to be secured upon the same
terms to citizens of every race and color.' 6 Restrictive racial covenants
are assertions of rights acquired by contract, not traditional incidents of
11. E.g., Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S.668 (1927); City of Richmond v. Dean, 281
U.S.704 (1930).
12. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.323 (1926) (dictum) encouraged such an approach;
racial covenants in and of themselves are not unconstitutional, only where state is
significantly involved. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); United States
v. Cruikshank et al., 92 U.S.542 (1875) (Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against
mere private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful).
13. 334 U.S.1 (1948). The leading of four cases known as the Racial Covenant Cases.
McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S.1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, 334 U.S.24
(1948). See Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892). Properly speaking, the
federal court's inability to enforce the covenant at the time of Gandolfo should have
been articulated in fifth amendment terms; especially so in the era before Eric R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S.633 (1938).
14. Prior to Shelley, only two cases were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court which
in any way involved the enforcement of such agreements. The first of these was
Corrigan v. Buckley, supra note 11, which was dismissed for want of a substantial
question, as it had originated in the federal courts on matter that arose in the District
of Columbia and therefore could present no issue under the Fourteenth Amendment
which by its terms applied only to the states the court held. Contra, Hurd v. Hodge,
supra note 12, which overruled as being inconsistent with the public policy of the
United States to permit federal courts in Nation's capital to exercise powers to compel
action denied the state courts. Secondly, in Hansbury v. Lee 311 U.S.32 (1940), judg-
ment was reversed upon grounds petitioners had been denied due process of law in
being held estopped to challenge the validity in earlier litigation which they did not
participate of such an agreement that had not fulfilled its own requirements. In neither
of these cases, however, was the question of constitutionality raised.
15. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 12, at 10. See also, Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S.483 (1954); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.249 (1953).
16. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.3 (1883). Accord, Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S.485 (1877).
A point of note is that such covenants have been used to exclude others than Negroes.
Indians, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos
among others.
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property rights; and states have with considerable freedom modified
the bounds of contract to which they will give effect. 17 The major
significance of the Racial Covenant Cases was that they, by holding
invalid what was once assumed to be property or contract rights, re-
affirmed the holding of Marsh v. State of Alabama,"s that there is nothing
in the Fourteenth Amendment that says it applies only to particular
actions or laws of the states.
Just as there has been for some time a relaxation of the expressed
state action requirement, 9 the effect of Reitman v. Mulkey seemingly
has extended coverage of the equal protection of the laws from situa-
tions where such racial covenants have been expressedly stated to those
situations as here where they are merely implied. Undoubtedly, the ef-
fect of this constitutional provision was to nullify the previously exist-
ing civil rights acts on fair housing in California.20 Article I, section 26,
provided a purported constitutional right to privately discriminate on
grounds which admittedly would be unavailable under the Fourteenth
Amendment should state action be involved.2'
It has been recognized that conduct that is formally private may be-
come so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limita-
tions placed on state action.22 The test is not the novelty of the form
it takes, but rather the ultimate result which is achieved; and it is ap-
parent that it is indeed the ultimate result that the court is primarily
concerned with in the instant case, even in derogation of a popular
mandate.
It is not a general property right which the state would be giving
cognizance to here, but what would usually amount to a community
pattern of racial discrimination. The movement from Shelley v. Kraemer
17. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 496
(1962).
18. 326 U.S.501 (1946).
19. The Civil Rights Cases, supra note 15, were the first and last time to date that a
majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court has given serious consideration to the
problem of the erosion of the federal system through relaxation of the state action re-
quirement. Supra note 5.
20. Prior to its enactment, the unconstitutionality of Proposition 14 was urged in
Lewis v. Jordan, Sac.7549 (June 3, 1964). In rejecting petition for mandamus to keep
proposition off the ballot, the court stated it would be more appropriate to pass on
such question after the election, but expressed grave doubts as to its constitutionality
at the time.
21. Mulkey v. Reitman, supra note 1, at 833.
22. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.296 (1966).
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to Reitman v. Mulkey demonstrates that where any implications of a
restrictive racial covenant is apparent the state cannot lend its support or
give effect by its courts to such arrangements merely because they are
not expressedly stated.
Gary E. Legner
Federal Procedure-STANDING OF CLASS REPRESENTING ORGANIZA-
TIONS. In compliance with a previously valid non-discriminatory con-
solidation policy, the Morrilton, Arkansas, Board of Education dis-
missed all seven teachers of a Negro high school in order to implement
a desegregation plan. This action brought by two of the Negro teachers,
the Arkansas Teachers Association, Inc. (ATA), and the U.S. Govern-
ment as intervenor, was an appeal' from a judgment of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court dismissing the complaint on its merits. The appellants sought
an injunction requiring the employment of high school teachers with-
out regard to race, and the reassignment of elementary teachers and
pupils on a basis which disregards race. Alternatively, appellants sought
relief by money damages, and the presentation and implementation of
a plan of reorganization of the school system on a non-racial basis.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that the Board of Education must
give preference to the dismissed teachers in filling future vacancies also
found that the ATA had standing as a party plaintiff to bring action
on a constitutional question in behalf of its members.3
It is a general rule, that in order to have standing to litigate a consti-
tutional question, one must be asserting the right in his own behalf;4
and that a class action must be brought by a member of the class rather
than, as here, by a class representing organization. 5 In the past, standing
to representative organizations has only been allowed in absence of com-
pliance with the above rules where:
(1) an attempt to assert rights as individuals might result in forfeit-
ing the protection of those rights.0
1. Smith v. The Bd. of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
2. d. at 773.
3. The court also reached the constitutional question involved holding the School
Board's action deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the four-
teenth Amendment.
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Commented on in 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAMnc, Sec.
17.07 (2d ed. 1964). "An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who,
by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced."
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a).
6. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-460 (1958).
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